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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAIL-
ROAD CO., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WASATCH CHEMICAL CO., a cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7399 
Respondent takes exception to the statement of facts 
eppearing in Appellant's Brief. While the so-called 
''nature of action'' on page 2 thereof constitutes a con-
cise statement of the case, the Statement of Facts is 
not supported in any manner by the record and, so far 
as appears therefrom, is a product of counsel's imagi-
nation. 
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Plaintiff is a railroad operating as a common car-
rier between points in California and Utah. As stipu-
lated by the parties, (Tr. 46) on or about the dates indi-
cated in Exhibit "A" attached to and made a part of 
Plaintiff's Complaint, there were shipped over Plaintiff's 
lines from San Jose, California to Defendant at Salt 
Lake City the commodity in question. Defendant re-
ceived the items and paid Plaintiff the amounts shown 
on said Exhibit "A" under the column captioned 
''Amount Paid.'' Plaintiff claims that under the pro-
visions of the applicable tariffs, the proper charge was 
that shown on said Exhibit "A" under the column 
"Tariff Charges" and brought this action for the dif-
ference between the two amounts, being the amount 
shown as "Balance Due" on Exhibit "A," plus the ap-
plicable federal tax on the transportation of property 
shown under the caption ''Tax.'' 
The only item shipped in each instance as an "Auto-
matic Spray Dip'' manufactured by the Livestock 
Sprayer Manufacturing Company of San Jose, Cali-
fornia, as portrayed in Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and 
"B," and Defendant's Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 and de-
scribed as "a combination of a motor, a pump, a storage 
tank, a filtering device, spray nozzles and an enclosure 
or device for holding or restraining cattle while being 
sprayed with D.D. T. or other new and modern insecti-
cides, mounted on two wheels and an axle with a draw 
bar and stand equipment." ('Tr. 28). The only issue 
before the trial court was, under the applicable tariff 
published by Plaintiff Railroad (Exhibit "C"), what 
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was the proper rate required to have been paid to Plain-
t~ff by Defendant· pursuant to the Interstate Commerce 
Act' The trial court found the issue of law in favor 
of Plaintiff and held that the article transported by 
Plaintiff and delivered to Defendant is properly classi-
fied as a livestock spraying pen or chute, wood and steel 
combined, Item No. 16937 of Western Classification No. 
72 contained in Consolidated Freight Classification No. 
17, and sprayers N.O.I.B.N. with engines, Item No. 
41017 of said classification, a combination article, set up, 
to which under the provisions of Rule 18 of said Con-
solidated Freight Classification No. 17 a first class rate 
is applicable. The trial court thereupon entered judg-
ment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant for 
the amount prayed, together with costs of court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RATE 
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT TO BE APPLI-
CABLE IS NOT IN ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT. 
A. Appellant has assigned as error ''The trial 
court erred in failing and refusing to submit to a jury 
the issue of reasonableness of the classification'' and 
argues that the classification applied by Respondent 
and sustained by the trial court was unreasonable. It 
is generally held that a shipper cannot maintain an ac-
t:on in either a state or a federal court to obtain relief 
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from an alleged unreasonable freight rate exacted or 
proposed to be exacted from him for an interstate ship-
ment where the rates so challenged have been filed and 
published by the carrier pursuant to law and have not 
been found to be unreasonable by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. He must, under the Interstate Com-
nterce Act, primarily invoke redress from the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, which body alone is vested with 
power to entertain original proceedings for the altera-
tion of an established schedule upon the ground that the 
rates fixed therein are unreasonable. (9 Am. Jur., Car-
ders, Section 180.) See 
Baldwin v. Soott County Milling Co. (1939), 307 U.S. 
478, 83 L. Ed. 1409. 
where the court held: 
"In the absence of prior finding by the Com-
mission that the tariff charges collected for in-
terstate transportation are unreasonable. there 
can be no enforceable claim for damages caused 
by exactions according to the tariff.'' 
There is nothing in the record which indicates that Ap-
pellant has ever had resort to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to determine whether or not the rate and 
classification applied by Respondent is reasonable or 
that the Commission has ever so found. Until Appellant 
can show that it has exhausted its administrative remedy 
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in this regard, it has no standing to raise the issue of 
reasonableness. 
It is well settled that in a court proceeding for an 
under-charge, the question of the unreasonableness or 
lmlawfulne3s of a rate, charge or classification is not 
open. The only question is that of tariff application, re-
gardless of the inherent lawfulness or unlawfulness of 
the resultant charges. See, for example, 
Davis v. Portlarnd Seed Company, 264 U. S. 403, 63 
La·w Ed. 762 (1924). 
where the tariff provision involved was in violation of 
Section Four of the Interstate Commerce Act and yet 
the court refused to give relief to the .shipper, saying: 
"The Statute requires rigid observance of the 
tariff, without regard to the inherent lawfulness 
of the rates specified." (Page 425) 
It is well settled that the question of reasonableness is 
not open to the court but only to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. See 
and 
Great Northern Railway Oo. v. Merchants' Elevator 
Co., 259 U.S. 285, 66 Law Ed. 943 (1922). 
Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U.S. 631, 86 Law Ed.; 1077 
(1942). 
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In the last named case, in a suit for under-charges, the 
court said: 
''The issue of the reasonableness of the rates 
was not open to the District Court. The meaning 
of the tariff had been determined by the Com-
mission. It remained to the railroad only to col-
lect the rates for which the tariff called and for 
the District Court only to see that the railroad did 
collect them.'' (Page 635). 
B. Unreasonableness of the rate as a defense would 
be in the nature of a counterclaim for damages and not 
only must first be raised before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission but must also be pleaded as such. Not only 
i~ there nothing in the record to indicate that Appellant 
raised the issue of reasonableness before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission but there is also nothing to indi-
cate that Appellant raised the issue of reasonableness 
in the court below. There is no reference in the pleadings 
or elsewhere in the record claiming that the rate asserted 
to be due by Plaintiff was unreasonable. The first and 
only reference appears in Appellant's brief. It is ele-
nlentary that issues not raised by pleading or not pre-
sented to or passed upon by the trial court will not be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court on appeal. 
Woolf v. G'flay, 48 Utah 239, 158 Pac. 788 (1916) 
Utah Assets v. Dooley Bros. Assn.-(1937) 92 Utah 
577, 70 Pac. 2d. 738. 
Bucher v. Equitable Life Assu~'flance Sqciety-(1937) 
91 Utah 179, 63 Pac. 2d. 604. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Appellant apparently presents three arguments that 
the decision of the trial court was an erroneous interpre-
tation of the tariff: (1) that the article .shipped is a 
spraying machine and therefore is within the classifica-
tion of sprayers N.O.I.B.N., Item No. 15380 of Com-
modity Tariff 260-A, or (2) that the article shipped is 
a combination of a sprayer and a vat, or (3) that the 
article is a combination of a sprayer and a de-horning 
chute (Item No. 16665 Consolidated Freight Classifica-
tion No. 17) or a combination of a sprayer and a .stall 
(Item No. 16955 Consolidated Freight Classification No. 
17). 
A. THE ARTICLE SHIPPED IS NOT A COMBINATION 
OF A SPRAYER AND A STALL OR A SPRAYER AND A 
DE-HORNING CHUTE. 
The latter two arguments presented by Appellant 
r.ssume that the Respondent's contention that the Spray-
Dip is a combination article is correct and take issue only 
with the description of the articles of which it is a com-
bination. 
Certainly, if the machine is a combination of a sprayer 
and a pen or chute, the pen or chute would be a spraying 
r,en or chute and not a de-horning chute. There is no 
evidence or contention that the device is designed or used 
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other than to hold cattle while being sprayed. Certainly 
nothing is shown that it is a device to hold the animal for 
de-horning. In fact, the manufacturer expressly testi-
fied that it could not be so used: 
''The only way he could get to an animal in 
this machine of ours would be to get inside. 
Surely nobody would be fooli.sh enough to get in-
side with a bull to castrate or de-horn or brand 
him. This machine can't possibly be used for any-
thing except the thing we have designed it and 
built it for. We wish it could. We wish we could 
sell it for other purpo~es. There would be more 
sales. But I can't think of anything other in the 
world than what we sell it for, the spraying of 
cattle." (Tr. 61). 
Nor would the stall classification (No. 16955) apply. 
A ''stall'' is defined in Webster's New I nte.rnational Dlic-
tionary, Second Edition, 1946, as: 
''A place where horses or cattle are kept; a 
.stable, a manger; esp. the compartment or divi-
sion of a stable for one horse, ox or the like.'' 
''Pen'' is defined in the same dictionary as: 
''A small enclosure for animals; any small 
place of confinement.'' 
''Chute'' is defined in the same dictionary as : 
'' Agric., a narrow high walled passageway 
or similar device for holding or restraining ani-
mals, esp. cattle, as for branding or de-horning." 
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Certainly the description, spraying pen or chute, (Item 
1.6937, Consolidated Freight Classification No. 17) is 
a more accurate and complete description of the portion 
of the Spray-Dip, designed to restrain or confine the 
animal while it is being .sprayed than to describe it as 
a place "\vhere horses or cattle are kept. A stall is gen-
erally regarded as a more permanent place for keeping 
the animal, as in a stable. Then too, the descriptive par-
ticiple ''spraying'' makes the application of Item 16'937 
rnore exact. It is also significant that the stall item ap-
pears in the original Consolidated Freight Classification 
K o. 17, but that the more particular item, spraying pen 
or chute ( 16937) did not appear until the issuance of 
Supplement No. 8 to Consolidated Freight Classification 
No. 17. Both items 16665 and 16955 are K. D. (knocked 
down) items. The Spray-Dip was shipped set-up. (S. U.). 
B. THE SPRAY-DIP IS NOT A COMBINATION OF A 
SPRAYER N.O.I.B.N. AND A VAT. 
Appellant's argument that the portion of the spray 
dip classified by the trial court as "an enclosure or de-
vice for holding or restraining cattle while being sprayed 
with D.D.T. or other new and modern insecticide" i.s a 
vat rather than a spraying pen or chute ignores the 
plain meaning of the words. As Appellant contends at 
Page 11 of its Brief: "Neither of the parties can urge 
t: strained or unnatural construction.'' Vat is defined 
In Webster's New Internationa(D1ictionary, supra, as: 
'' 1. A large vessel, cistern, tub or barrel; e3p., 
such a large vessel for holding liquors in an im-
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mature state. 2. A measure of capacity. 3. A 
liquor containing a dye which has been converted 
by reduction into a soluble non-dyeing form. 4. 
A salt pit." 
Clearly, the large boxlike structure in which the animal 
is confined while being sprayed is not a vat. The only 
place where liquid is stored or held on the Spray-Dip 
is in the storage tank on the side of the article above 
its right wheel. See Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and "B". 
The court so found upon examining the exhibits and 
viewing one of the articles in question. (Tr. 63). Mr. 
William Abildgaard, the representative of the manu-
facturer of the machine also testified that that portion 
of the article is to hold the animal, not to store liquids. 
"Well, it has all of those different components 
that any spraying machine has, plus instead of 
having to hold the anmals or drive them up into 
a corner some place and have them flouncing 
around, you drive them into this machine, that is, 
one at a time.'' (Tr. 54). 
"It goes down through the floor into the drain 
pit, picked up automaticlly by an injector, brought 
up through a revolving strainer where all the 
foreign matter is taken out, and drops back into 
the tank and used over and over again.'' (Tr. 55). 
'' Q. Then this shown here at the top and shown 
again in these two photographs, and on Ex-
hibit B, .are including the space--" 
"A. Yes." 
'' Q. --To restrain or hold the animal~'' 
''A. Yes, and to catch the chemical.'' 
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'' Q. That collects in the bottom 1'' 
''A. Yes." 
'' Q. But the animal comes in one end, the doors 
are shut, and it is restrained in there~'' 
"A. Yes." (Tr. 57). 
'' Q. So the function of this piece on here is to 
hold the animaH" 
"A. To hold him and spray him." (Tr. 58). 
It may be granted that the spray dip makes the old 
method of putting cattle through a dipping vat obsolete 
as is shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and as testified 
by witness Abildgaard: 
"Q. What particular portion in that does this 
machine take, in the method of dipping~" 
''A. Well, of course, this replaces the dipping 
vat." 
'' Q. What position in the method, the older meth-
od of dipping livestock, what position in 
that method of dipping would this machine 
take~" 
"A. Well, as I would understand it, that old 
method of dipping livestock, this simply re-
places it. That has become obsolete." (Tr. 60). 
But the mere fact that the automobile made the horse 
and buggy obsolete does not warrant calling the auto-
mobile a horse and buggy or the automobile motor a 
lwrse. 
Further, even if it be regarded as a vat or tank, the 
same first-class rate would apply as applies under the 
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tariff as interpreted by the trial court. See Items 41620, 
51705, 41785 of Consolidated Freight Classification No. 
17. (Exhibit "C"). 
C. THE SPRAY-DIP IS NOT A "SPRAYER N.O.I.B.N." 
Appellant contends that the spray-dip is a machine 
and as such its parts are to be disregarded. It further 
contends that the best decription of this machine is 
"sprayers N.O.I.B.N." appearing in the Commodity 
Tariff 260-A. N.O.I.B.N. means "not otherwise indexed 
by name.'' Therefore, that description could apply only 
if there were no description or combination of descrip-
tions which more specifically describe the article. 
Dar~ing v. N.Y.C. and St. Louis R.R., 213 I.C.C. 
418 (1935). 
It was stipulated by counsel (Tr. 47-50) that Mr. L. 
N. Brown, the tariff expert produced by Plaintiff would 
have testified that in his opinion there is no commodity 
rate for the article in Tariff ~60-A and that it is his 
opinion that there is no specific description to cover 
the article in Consolidated Freight Classification No. 
17, but that the classification most closely applying to 
this article is a combination of 16937 first appearing in 
Supplement 8, Consolidated Freight Classification under 
the heading "Farm, Dairy, Garden, Livestock, Orchard, 
Poultry Equipment" as spraying pens or chutes, live-
stock, N.O.I.B.N., wood and steel combined, loose or in 
packages, to which the first-class rate applies on L.C.L. 
shipments and sprayers N.O.I.B.N. under Item 41017 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
of Classification No. 17. No contrary evidence was pre-
sented by Defendant. There was adequate evidence to 
support the finding of the court. In fact, none opposing 
it. It is elementary that if there is sufficient evidence to 
support the findings of the trial court, its findings are 
conclusive. 
Woolf v. Gray, supra. 
The court found that a combination of "spraying 
I)ens or chutes'' and ''sprayer'' was a more specific de-
·3cription of the Spray-Dip than merely "sprayer." The 
combination rule provides: 
''Rule 18. Combination Articles. When not spe-
cifically classified articles which have been com-
bined or attached to each other will be charged 
at the rating for the highest classified article 
of the combination.'' Consolidated Freight Class-
ification No. 17, Page 138. Ex. "C." 
Therefore, the rate applicable to spraying pens or chutes, 
which ia a first-class rate, would apply to the shipment 
of Spray-Dips. 
Other examples of the application of the combi-
nation rule are : 
Day .and Night Water He·ater Co. v. Southern Baci-
fic Co., 161 I.C.C. 45 (1920). 
In that case an item known as a thermostatic valve was 
shipped. This consisted of a brass valve and a thermo-
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stat, consisting of a carbon rod in a copper tube. As 
installed in a water heater, the valve is inserted in the 
gas feed pipe and the carbon and copper element in 
the water space of the heater. With variations in temp-
erature, it would increase or decrease the flow of gas 
to the burner. The article was originally shipped and 
billed as ''brass valves,'' there being no specific rate 
for thermostatic valves. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission held that the item was a combination of a brass 
valve and a thermostat and under the Combination Rule 
would take the higher rate. 
Spence v. Director-General, 87 I.C.C. 339 (1924). 
In that case, gasoline engines with gears which could be 
disconnected by means of a clutch were shipped. They 
were billed and freight was collected originally under the 
item of "engines N.O.I.B.N." The I. C. C. held that it 
was a combination of a gasoline engine N.O.I.B.N. and 
pumping powers and applied the higher rate under the 
Combination Rule. 
Humble Oil & Refinilng Co. v. Cisco and N. E. Rail-
way, 186 I.C.C. 153 (1923). 
In that case tool joints were attached to pipe. The I.C.C. 
held that these were a combination article and applied 
Rule 18. 
Crancer v. Lowden, 121 Fed. 2d. 645; affirmed 315 
U. S. 631, 86 Law Ed. 1077. 
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In that case, used pipe was shipped. Some of the pipe 
had protectors on the end to protect the thread. Some 
of the pipe could be re-used and some could only be re-
smelted. The item was shipped as ''scrap iron, N.O.I. 
B.N.'' classification. The court held that it was a com-
bination of pipe, used pipe and pipe fittings and applied 
the highest rate under the Combination Article Rule. 
It is clear from the evidence that the Spray-Dip is 
more than an ordinary sprayer, such as a housewife u.ses 
on the ants, flies, rodents, or other insect pests, or such 
as a farmer uses on fruit trees, similarly to destroy 
in.sects. A "sprayer" is defined in Webster's New In-
ternational Dictionary, supra, as ''any instrument, de-
vice or mechanism for spraying liquids.'' The Spray-
Dip not only spray liquids on animal.s, but it collects 
the excess liquid, filters it, stores it and u.ses it again, 
and, at the same time, confines the animal and holds it 
still while spraying it. As testified by Mr. Abildgaard: 
"Well, it has all of tho.se different compon-
ents that any spraying machine has, plus instead 
of having to hold the animal or drive them up into 
a corner some place and having them flouncing 
around, you drive them into this machine, that is, 
one at a time.'' (Tr. 54. Emphasis .supplied.) 
''And this place of confinement is specially 
designed to hold the animal in line for the spray-
ing operation." (Tr. 59). 
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An examination of the machine itself convinced the trial 
court that there was more than a sprayer involved and 
that it could be more specifically described as a sprayer 
combined with a spraying pen or chute than as merely a 
sprayer. The only items otherwise specified in CFC 17 
are automatic animal sprayers, ( 16935) and boiler or 
furnace sprayers (27550). It is inconceivable that the 
same generic word ''sprayers'' that would include 
''flit guns'' and garden sprayers would be considered 
to describe more closely a Spray-Dip than the combina-
tion description of ''spraying pens and chutes'' and 
''sprayer.'' The issue in 
Tubbs v. Mechanics' Insurance Co., 131 Iowa 217, 108 
N. W. 325. 
tited by Appellant was whether "machinery of all kinds 
and descriptions'' as used in an insurance policy was a 
description broad enough to include a steam boiler and 
pipe installed in a steam laundry, not whether there was 
some term in the policy which more specifically de-
scribed the boiler and pipes. Granted that the Spray-Dip 
is a sprayer, but is it also more specifically described 
in the tariff~ That is the issue here. 
For example, a refrigerator is in a sense a machine 
for cooling food, but it could be more specifically de-
scribed than referring to it as a cooling machine by 
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calling it a combination of a cooling unit and an in·su-
lated storage box. 
e.g. Norge Oorp. v. Long Island R. R., 220 I.C.C. 470. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent submits that the trial 
court did not err and that the decision below should be 
a:ffirmed and Respondent be awarded its costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PET·ER W. BILLINGS, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, 
MOFFAT & MABEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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